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attorney-client privilege regarding these documents, in part be-
cause there was no evidence of an intent by the bank to waive the
privilege.
In People v. Smith, the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, held that a warrantless search of an airline freight package is
unconstitutional absent "articulable facts" illustrating "a danger to
life or property." Such a finding would constitute an "emergency
exception" to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Finally, in People v. Banville, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, held that CPL section 195.10 permits a criminal de-
fendant to waive a grand jury indictment and proceed by superior
court information only if the waiver is exercised prior to the filing
of the indictment.
The members of Volume 62 hope that the cases analyzed in
The Survey will be of interest and value to the bench and bar.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York recognizes an exception to waiver of attorney-client
privilege for inadvertent voluntary disclosure of privileged
documents
The attorney-client privilege1 protects confidential communi-
1 See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore
provides the following definition of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except if the protection be
waived.
Id.; see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(discussing circumstances where privilege is applicable); People v. Belge, 59 App. Div. 2d
307, 309, 399 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (4th Dep't 1977) (communication is privileged when made
for purpose of obtaining legal advice with expectation of confidentiality). The attorney-cli-
ent privilege has been expressed both statutorily, see CPLR 4503 (McKinney Supp. 1988),
and ethically, see MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONsIBILITY EC 4-1 (1988). It can also
be found in the constitutional right to counsel. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6. But see People v. O'Connor, 85 App. Div. 2d 92, 97, 447 N.Y.S.2d 553, 557 (4th Dep't
1982) (attorney-client privilege not constitutionally guaranteed, but a statutory provision
embodying common law rule).
A guiding principle behind the privilege is to encourage the public's use of legal advice.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). "The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice ... serves public ends." Id.; see also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
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cations between attorneys and clients concerning legal advice.' An
attorney may rely on this privilege to prevent the discovery of
materials that would otherwise be available to an adversary.3 Tra-
ditionally, courts have construed the attorney-client privilege nar-
rowly,4 holding that not only voluntary,5 but also unintentional or
inadvertent disclosure of protected material through discovery will
constitute a waiver of the privilege.' Recently, however, in Manu-
470 (1888) (attorney-client privilege removes client's apprehension of disclosure); United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358 (expert legal advice essential in today's complex soci-
ety in order to be governed properly within bounds of law). The privilege also encourages
consultation between attorney and client by "assur[ing] the client that any statements he
makes in seeking legal advice will be kept strictly confidential." See Permian Corp. v.
United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The client may seek legal advice with
confidence that his disclosures "will not later be exposed to public view to his embarrass-
ment or legal detriment." Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985, 431
N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (1980); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 62 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 465 N.E.2d
345, 348, 476 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (1984) (privileged communication must be made to obtain
legal advice). But see Priest, 51 N.Y.2d at 67, 409 N.E.2d at 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514 ("even
where the technical requirements of the privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a
proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure"). See generally E. CLEARY, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 170-72 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]
(purposes of rules of privilege).
2 See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
"The privilege ... does not extend to every communication between lawyer and client but
only to those as to which there is an intention of confidentiality." Id. The privilege is ap-
plied to communications regarding legal opinions based on information provided by the cli-
ent in confidence. See United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358. The attorney-client
privilege originated from a "broad value of high-mindedness and honor ostensibly inherent
in the business of lawyering." Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Roles, Balancing,
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REV. 464, 465 (1977).
1 See Priest, 51 N.Y.2d at 68-69, 409 N.E.2d at 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514. Generally, the
client alone has the privilege and the power to waive it. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 1, § 93, at 223. However, the client may give his attorney authority to exercise the
power. See id.
4 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1983); In re Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 223, 391 N.E.2d 967, 972,
417 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (1979).
' See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (voluntary disclosure by holder of privilege inconsistent with confidential relationship
and waives privilege); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.) (disclosure to
third party by client of communication with attorney eliminates privilege), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 867 (1973).
6 See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18,
24 (9th Cir. 1981) (" 'inadvertence' of disclosure does not as a matter of law prevent the
occurrence of waiver"); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (privilege waived by production of document); Underwater Storage, Inc. v.
United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) (inadvertent disclosure by
counsel chargeable to client); Kelsey-Hayes Wheel, 15 F.R.D. at 464 (privilege does not
apply when third person surreptitiously obtains document); see also 8 WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 1, §§ 2325-26, at 633. See generally Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the
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facturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc.," the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, confronted for the first time the spe-
cific problem of inadvertent disclosure in the context of large docu-
ment productions.' In rejecting the traditional approach, the court
held that the inadvertent production of six documents by a bank's
counsel did not waive the bank's attorney-client privilege with re-
spect to those documents because there was no evidence of the
bank's intention to do so."
In Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., the plaintiff bank
brought an action against a debtor to recover delinquent sinking
fund payments.' 0 The defendant debtor counterclaimed, 11 and de-
manded that the bank produce voluminous records and docu-
ments, including all correspondence, memoranda, and notes per-
taining to the underlying dispute. 2 The bank's attorney then
reviewed several boxes of files to identify and remove any docu-
ments containing privileged materials. 13 Despite utilizing this
screening procedure, the bank's attorney subsequently discovered
that six documents containing privileged matter were inadver-
tently included in the files disclosed. 14 The bank promptly moved
Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REv. 637, 640-46 (1986) (criticism of inadvertent
waiver); Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1605,
1633-37 (1986) (discussing inadvertent waiver); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents
Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REv. 598, 604-05 (1983)
("[Ilnadvertent disclosures do not include those which were intended at the time of disclo-
sure but were regretted later.").
132 App. Div. 2d 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999 (4th Dep't 1987).
8 Id. at 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1003-04.
Id. at 393, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
10 Id. at 394, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. The defendant debtor claimed that no payments
were required because the plaintiff's interpretation of a debt modification between the par-
ties was incorrect and that, therefore, a deduction was warranted before any sinking fund
payments were to be made. Id.
11 Id. The parties had executed a "Debt Modification Agreement" under which the de-
fendant agreed to issue shares of its preferred stock in payment of a debt. Id. The parties
also executed a "Sinking Fund Agreement" in which the defendant was to make payments
into a sinking fund to redeem its stock. Id. On its counterclaim, the defendant claimed the
plaintiff had breached the agreement by not selling its entire preferred stock position by a
certain date, thereby rendering both agreements void. Id.
12 Id.
" Id. at 394-95, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. When the defendant's counsel requested that
certain documents be copied, the bank's counsel "arranged for a paralegal in his office to
identify in which box each document was found, to copy the documents and to deliver
them." Id. at 395, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. "The bank's counsel did not examine any of the
requested documents after they had been designated for copying by representatives of the
defendant." Id.
14 Id. at 395, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
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for a protective order directing the return of the six documents
and enjoining the use of the disclosed materials in further proceed-
ings.15 The Supreme Court, Special Term, Erie County, denied the
motion, finding that the bank had waived the attorney-client privi-
lege by failing to preserve it through due diligence.'6
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously re-
versed the lower court's ruling and granted the plaintiff's motion
for a protective order.17 Writing for the court, Justice Green noted
the practical concerns of voluminous discovery in corporate litiga-
tion, particularly the inevitability that some privileged documents
will be disclosed.' 8 The court acknowledged that inadvertent dis-
closure traditionally waives the attorney-client privilege.' 9 How-
ever, the court reasoned that the harsh traditional approach rests
on the unrealistic assumption that preservation of the secrecy of a
communication is always possible and that, in any event, disclosure
makes it impossible to achieve the benefits of the privilege.20 The
court further reasoned that although confidentiality can never be
restored, a court can repair much of the damage by preventing or
restricting use of the privileged information.2 In concluding that
no waiver had occurred, the court determined that the client in-
tended to retain confidentiality22 and that it had taken reasonable
15 Id.
16 Id. Special Term, after reviewing the six documents in camera, further found that
they did not constitute protectable attorney work product. Id. Although representing dicta,
the Appellate Division disagreed, explaining that "[a]n attorney's work product includes
memoranda, correspondence, mental impressions and personal beliefs conducted, prepared
or held by the attorney." Id. at 396, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1946)). The court stated that each of the six privileged documents also hap-
pened to be attorney work product immune from disclosure. Id., 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03.
17 Id. at 401, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
-8 Id. at 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1003-04.
19 Id. at 399, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
20 Id. Other courts applying the traditional rule have assumed that the client has the
ability to prevent disclosure. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771,
775 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (failure to take necessary steps to prevent disclosure justifies waiver);
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954) (risk of
insufficient precautions rests with the party claiming the privilege); see also Marcus, supra
note 6, at 1615-16 (discussing how waiver undermines confidence in privilege).
21 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 2d at 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004;
see also Note, supra note 6, at 608-09 (court can insure inadvertent disclosure does not
affect outcome of litigation).
22 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 2d at 399, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
The court declared that "[i]ntent must be the primary component of any waiver test." Id. In
examining intent, the court found it significant that "the bank's assistant vice-president
who had delivered the entire file to counsel stated that he did not intend to disclose privi-
19881
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precautions to prevent disclosure as evidenced by its screening
process and its prompt objection to the inadvertent disclosure.2 3
Although the Appellate Division correctly held that an inad-
vertent disclosure of privileged material should not automatically
result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 4 it is submitted
leged material." Id. Some courts have increasingly allowed parties to either stipulate by
agreement or obtain a court order that inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents dur-
ing discovery will not waive the privilege. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stipulation); Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Busi-
ness Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1978) (court order); Western Fuels Ass'n
v. Burlington N.R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Wyo. 1984) (court order); Eutectic Corp. v.
Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (court order). But see W.R. Grace & Co., 446
F. Supp. at 775 (general rule is that voluntary production of documents waives privilege).
11 132 App. Div. 2d at 399-400, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05. The court found the rationale
of those cases rejecting the traditional view to be persuasive. Id. at 398-99, 522 N.Y.S.2d at
1004.
Courts rejecting the traditional view, holding that inadvertent disclosure does not result
in waiver, use a reasonable precautions approach. See Lois Sportswear, Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). When the issue is "whether or not the release of
the documents was a knowing waiver... [t]he elements which go into that determination
include the reasonableness of the precautions .... the time taken to rectify the error, the
scope of the discovery and the extent of the disclosure." Id.; see also National Helium Corp.
v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 612, 614 (1979) (precautions used must objectively establish
intent not to waive).
In Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
the court attempted to discern the privilege-holder's intention where the plaintiffs' employ-
ees found privileged documents in a trash dumpster outside the defendants' office. Id. at
256. The court reasoned that "the relevant consideration is the intent of the defendants to
maintain the confidentiality of the documents as manifested in the precautions they took."
Id. at 260. By failing to shred the documents the defendants lost the privilege. Id. Using a
similar analysis, the court in National Helium Corp. noted that the plaintiff had subjec-
tively intended to retain the attorney-client privilege. 219 Ct. Cl. at 614. Id. However, the
court stated that "[tihe only question is whether the procedure followed by plaintiff was so
lax, careless, or inadequate that plaintiff must objectively be considered as indifferent to
disclosure." Id. (emphasis added).
The Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. court also considered whether the party
claiming waiver would suffer prejudice if a protective order were granted. 132 App. Div. 2d
at 400, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
24 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 2d at 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
There are inherent problems in reviewing large numbers of documents. See Control Data
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1233, 1235 (D.
Minn. 1972). In Control Data, IBM utilized an extensive screening procedure to produce
substantial numbers of documents within an accelerated discovery period. Id. at 1234. De-
spite these efforts, some privileged documents were disclosed. Id. IBM then created the
position of an "interceptor" to review documents in the final stage of the process. Id. When
Control Data objected to the delay caused by this process, the court required removal of the
interceptor. Id. The court ruled, however, that under the circumstances inadvertent disclo-
sure would not result in waiver. Id. at 1237. In Transamerica Computer Co., the court held
that production in the Control Data case had been in effect "compelled" by court-ordered
accelerated discovery proceedings, and that IBM had not waived its privilege in the subse-
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that, while recognizing the inherent and practical realities of large,
voluminous discovery, the court has provided little guidance to
practitioners and the judiciary in defining the objective reasonable
precautions that must be taken to show that there was no inten-
tion to waive the privilege. In determining whether the screening
procedure was a reasonable precaution, the court merely stated
that despite the error of disclosure, the screener was a competent
attorney who could differentiate between privileged and non-privi-
leged documents.25 It is suggested that in examining the adequacy
of the screening procedure, the court should have adopted a more
extensive and definitive reasonable precautions test. In finding the
level of screening competence adequate, the court did not look be-
yond the fact that the screener was an attorney.26 It is submitted
that other factors the court should have considered were the thor-
oughness of the manner in which the documents were scrutinized, 7
quent antitrust action. 573 F.2d at 652. The court explained the inevitability of inadvertent
disclosure further:
There were literally millions of ways for mistakes to be made in the screening
process. For example, mistakes could easily occur during any of the millions of
purely mechanical steps necessary for successful screening ....
The failure to perform so simple a mechanical act as the insertion of a docu-
ment into a folder would also result in the production of privileged material. In
addition to the plethora of opportunities for mechanical blunders, there were in-
herent in the process numerous opportunities to overlook privileged material re-
sulting from what might be characterized as visual or judgmental mistakes.
Id.; see also International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 511 (2d
Cir. 1972) (privilege was not waived by inadvertent disclosure during court-ordered accelera-
tion of discovery), appeal dismissed, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 980 (1974).
Other recent inadvertent disclosure cases have recognized the increasing size of docu-
ment productions. See, e.g., Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1215-16 (screening "millions of doc-
uments"); W.R. Grace & Co., 446 F. Supp. at 775 ("voluminous amount of discovery").
25 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 2d at 399, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
The court noted that the screening task had not been delegated to someone without legal
training. Id.
26 Id., 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05. The court did not inquire as to what level of ability was
needed for this particular screening task, see id., nor did the court inquire into whether the
screener had expertise or a history of carelessness in reviewing privileged documents. See id.
27 See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
"It is difficult to be persuaded that these documents were intended to remain confidential in
the light of the fact that they were indiscriminately mingled with the other routine docu-
ments of the corporation and that no special effort to preserve them in segregated files ...
was made." Id.
It is submitted that the Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. court could have included
such factors as whether the documents were reviewed by the box, by the file, or individually,
as well as what criteria were used to determine whether the material was privileged.
1988]
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whether a multi-tiered screening approach was necessary,", and a
comparison of the number of documents reviewed, the number
that were privileged, and the number that were inadvertently dis-
closed.29 As the ratio of inadvertently disclosed documents to privi-
leged documents approaches one, it is suggested that the screening
procedure used in discovery would be unreasonable. Additionally,
the court should have focused on significant external factors such
as time constraints 0 and monetary costs.3 1
Since the factors considered in any reasonable precautions test
will, in effect, become a standard of conduct for the bar,32 it is sug-
gested that the absence of clear guidelines will create a greater
burden on attorneys and judges. It is submitted that in order to
determine what screening procedure to use, attorneys will now
have to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of
screening against the risk of waiver. 3 In larger cases it may be un-
clear what level of precautions will be sufficient. Additionally, the
burden on the judiciary in supervising discovery may also be in-
creased due to blanket privilege claims by overly cautious
attorneys.34
While the Appellate Division correctly rejected the traditional
28 The Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. court considered one attorney's review to
be sufficient. 132 App. Div. 2d at 394-95, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. It is suggested that a
court should examine whether more than one level of screening is appropriate in any given
situation, as well as the number of screeners required at each level.
29 See Note, supra note 6, at 622.
30 See International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir.
1972), appeal dismissed, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980
(1974); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan) 1233, 1235 (D. Minn. 1972).
" See Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 229
(1985); Marcus, supra note 6, at 1608-13.
2 See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967)
(rules of privilege should be classified as substantive or quasi-substantive because they af-
fect people's conduct at primary stages of activity).
" The Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. court may have caused further confusion
with its statement that "reasonable precautions might be required to promote appropriate
standards of care in document production," but "there is no reason to apply the harsh tradi-
tional approach" if remedying the accidental disclosure would not "cause the adversary any
prejudice." 132 App. Div. 2d at 398, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. It is suggested that a court fol-
lowing this edict might issue a protective order even where a screening procedure was unrea-
sonable if the adversary has not relied on the disclosed material.
4 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1192 (D.S.C.
1975). In Duplan, the court was "saddled with the burden of conducting [an] in-camera
examination," id., when one million documents were produced. Id. at n.4; see also In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 552 F. Supp. 517, 517 (N.D., Ill. 1982) (parties' request for inspec-
tion of 40,000 documents would be equivalent of court wading through one hundred novels).
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broad waiver approach to inadvertent disclosure, it is submitted
that further judicial guidance is necessary. Although a client may
now avoid an automatic waiver of the attorney-client privilege
where he utilizes reasonable precautions to prevent an inadvertent
disclosure, it remains unclear what standard the New York courts
will use to determine whether a screening procedure is reasonable.
Hopefully, the Court of Appeals will soon provide appropriate
guidelines.
Scott Lawrence Lanin
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
"Emergency exception" search needs articulable facts leading to
the conclusion that a danger exists to be reasonable under the
fourth amendment
The fourth amendment1 requires the police to obtain a war-
rant before conducting a search and seizure.2 There are a few
"well-delineated exceptions" to this requirement, including the
"emergency exception,' 3 which is applied when a situation requires
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Supreme Court has held that
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," subject to several recognized exceptions. Id.;
see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (fourth amendment "stays the
hands of the police unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate"); People v.
Vaccaro, 39 N.Y.2d 468, 472, 348 N.E.2d 886, 889, 384 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (1976) ("strong
judicial preference for search warrants").
The warrant clause of the fourth amendment ensures the protection of the people from
"unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). "The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral
judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or con-
duct a search." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); cf. Bloom, The Supreme
Court and its Purported Preference for Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1983) (crit-
icizing Supreme Court for not adhering to this principle).
3 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Other generally recognized exceptions include: "consent"
to be searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); "plain view," see
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1982); "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon, see Warden
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